Another Century of Economic Science by Stiglitz, Joseph E.
The Economic Journal, ioi (January 1991), 134-141
Printed in Great Britain
ANOTHER CENTURY OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE*
Joseph E. Stiglitz
I. METHODOLOGICAL INNOVATION:
THE TRIUMPHS OF TWENTIETH-CENTURY ECONOMICS
There is a widespread consensus that during the past century, economic science
has come of age. It has developed powerful statistical tools to analyse economic
data, to make forecasts, and to test alternative hypotheses, and it has employed
sophisticated mathematical techniques to articulate its theories and to prove
basic theorems characterising the economy. Samuelson (1947) encapsulated
the mid-century enthusiasm for the scientific method in his classic Foundations
of Economic Analysis, arguing that economics should be based on observable
behaviour and testable hypotheses, and, with his theory of revealed preference,
showing how this could be done with the theory of consumers' behaviour.^
II. METHODOLOGY OVER SUBSTANCE? OR IDEOLOGY OVER SCIENCE?
Yet, in spite of these methodological triumphs, the subject does not bear all the
hallmarks of some of the other sciences. Most strikingly, while economists of
many persuasions may agree about the tools to be employed, there is no
agreement about the basic economic model for describing the economy: while
in many circles, the competitive model, with perfectly informed agents, rational
consumers and value maximising firms, is believed to provide the foundations
for understanding both the aggregative behaviour of the economy and its
components, in other circles, that model is viewed with some circumspection.
Evidently, the tools are not strong enough to discriminate among funda-
mentally different hypotheses, or at least not strong enough to overcome
differences in prior beliefs, beliefs which are often influenced by ideological
concerns.
III. TW^ENTY-FIRST CENTURY ECONOMICS:
CLOSER TO A TRUE SCIENCE?
My hope - and belief- is that the next century will be marked by a greater
confluence of ideas, a greater degree of agreement on the underlying
descriptions of the economy, not just on the tools used to analyse it. To be sure,
economists will continue to differ in the detailed interpretation of events, and
in the appropriateness of a particular model to a particular situation.
* Financial support from the National Science Foundation and the Hoover Institution are gratefully
acknowledged.
^ The irony that the logical foundations of Logical Positivism had already been severely attacked by the
time that Samuelson tried to import it into economics need not detain us here.
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IV. A GENERAL ECONOMIC THEORY, SYNTHESISING MACROECONOMICS
AND MICROECONOMICS
The disparity in how different economists view the economy is perhaps most
apparent if we reflect on the two great achievements of the past century: the
development of the neoclassical-Walrasian paradigm, including the proofs of
the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, the formal articulation of
Adam Smith's invisible hand conjecture on the efficiency of market economies;
and the development of Keynesian economics, with its argument that capitalist
economies may be characterised by unemployment equilibria. The view of
capitalism reflected in these two achievements seem diametrically opposed, and
not even Samuelson's assertion of the neoclassical synthesis - that the economy,
once the problems of unemployment were corrected, was well described by the
neoclassical model - could smooth over the obvious schizophrenia in the
profession. As I have written elsewhere (Greenwald and Stiglitz, 1987), there
were two obvious remedies: making macroeconomics like neoclassical
microeconomics (the new classical and real business cycle theories); and trying
to develop a microeconomics which yielded aggregative implications which
were more consistent with the observed behaviour. As the memories of the
Great Depression and the multitude of other, earlier episodes of mass
unemployment receded, the former school enjoyed a brief moment in the sun
- maybe the Great Depression was not that bad, after all! But events have an
uncanny way of interfering with such euphoria about the market economy, and
the extended periods of high unemployment in Europe have placed new
emphasis on research attempting to provide the micro-foundations of
unemployment and business fluctuations. During the next century, I am
confident that we will construct a unified theory, based on the recognition of
the importance of information costs and other imperfections in labour, capital,
and product markets.^
V. THE DEMISE OF EARLY TWENTIETH-CENTURY NEOCLASSICAL
ECONOMICS*
One of the great achievements of the neoclassical economics of the past half
century is the formulation of testable hypotheses. Some of the most interesting
- such as the Modigliani-Miller theorem, showing that firm financial structure
did not matter, and its correlate implication, that investment and other aspects
' As, for example, sketched out in my 1987 paper with Bruce Greenwald which discusses both
information problems in the labour market (efficiency wage theories) and in the capital market, and in
subsequent work. Other strands of ongoing research, such as those stressing the role of increasing returns and
complementaries, will undoubtedly play a part in the unified theory which will ultimately be developed.
' There seems no agreed-upon definition of neoclassical economics; by some, the term neoclassical is
synonymous with 'good'; thus recent work in transactions costs and information economics is embraced as
part of neoclassical economics. I am using the term here (with the qualifier 'early twentieth century,' lest
there be any confusion) to represent the perfect competition, perfect market model in all of its
representations, including Samuelson's Foundations, Arrow-Debreu, and Modigliani-Miller.
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of firm behaviour did not depend on firm balance sheet and cash fiow variables
- have been tested and rejected, both on the basis of casual empiricism and
detailed econometric studies. While debates remain about which of the
assumptions underlying the analysis is most faulty, e.g. the absence of
bankruptcy, the assumption of perfect information, the hypothesis that firm
income in each state of nature is fixed (unaffected by firm behaviour, which in
turn might be affected by financial structure), the absence of transactions costs,
it is clear that dropping any one of these assumptions leads to markedly
different results.
The economists of the twentieth century, by pushing the neoclassical model
to its logical conclusions, and thereby illuminating the absurdities of the world
which they had created, have made an invaluable contribution to the
economics of the coming century: they have set the agenda, work on which has
already begun. We have already seen how the information theoretic paradigm
can explain behaviour in the capital market (such as credit rationing and red-
lining), product market (such as price dispersion and a variety of arrangements,
such as non-linear pricing, intended to price discriminate in an environment in
which informational imperfections limit perfect price discrimination), and
labour market (with wages set at levels above market clearing).
VI. THE NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS
Not only does this strand of literature offer the hope of providing the micro-
foundations required to explain observed aggregative behaviour of the
economy, but it also provides an explanation of many of the central institutional
features of the economy. In the earlier part of the century there were major
conflicts between institutional economists, who saw the particular arrange-
ments by which particular economies conducted their economic affairs as
essential, and neoclassical economists, who sought to see through these
inessential details to the underlying fundamental forces — the forces of demand
and supply. By the middle of the century, the triumph of neoclassical economics
was - almost - complete, certainly in America and England, and by 1980, even
in Germany. Yet, before the death-knell had been sounded, a New Institutional
Economics had arisen, attempting to use the new insights to explain the
institutions and to examine their consequences. For instance, Cheung (1969)
argued that transactions costs could explain the institution of sharecropping,
while Stiglitz (1974) developed a theory of sharecropping based on the costs of
monitoring workers' effort. While both theories provided explanations of the
persistence and pervasiveness of this institution, and even provided suggestions
of the conditions under which one might expect it to become relatively less
important, they had markedly different implications for, for instance, the
consequences of a land reform. I expect that during the next century, this New
Institutional economics will fiourish, providing insights into more and more of
the detailed arrangements through which economic affairs are conducted, and
in some cases, provide bases for altering those arrangments in ways which will
enhance economic efficiency.
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VII. ORGANISATIONAL ECONOMICS AND COMPARATIVE
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
The major economic event of the latter part of the twentieth century has
undoubtedly been the demise of socialism. While the desirability of socialism
was a central subject of discussion in debates (e.g. between Hayek and Von
Mises, on the one hand, and Lange-Lerner-Taylor on the other) during the
first half of the century, it was not until the development of information
economics during the past fifteen years that the nature of the information
problem stressed by Hayek in his classic (1945) paper has been better
understood.* We have begun to understand, for instance, which of the many
information problems facing an economy prices really adequately address. As
the former socialist economies think about the kind of economic system they
would like to adopt - is there, for instance, a 'third w a y ' ? - their discussions
have focused attention on such central issues as the role of property and the role
of competition. The exploration of these questions, and an enhanced
understanding of the merits of alternative economic systems, is likely to be
another major achievement of economics of the next century.*'^
One aspect of this analysis will focus on the economics of organisations. Most
economic activity occurs within organisations, within which only limited use is
made of the price system. It has frequently been observed that General Motors
is larger than many economies. The success of the economy depends not just on
how well markets work, but how well these organisations work. We have only
just begun the exploration of how organisations function, what are the
consequences of alternative ways of organising decision making, and what are
the interactions between organisational design and incentives. (See, for
example, Sah and Stiglitz (1985).) We know, for instance, that rent-seeking
behaviour may be important within private organisations, just as it is in the
public sphere.' While I predict major advances in this area, which until
recently has remained on the periphery of mainstream economics, I see one
major obstacle that will limit the success of this research endeavour: the
interactions within organisations, particularly small organisations, are governed
not just by the narrow 'rational' concerns upon which economics has
traditionally focused. (See Simon and March (1955).)
VIII. BROADENING THE 'RATIONAL ECONOMIC M O D E L '
The deficiencies in the 'rational actor' model have long been recognised, but
economists have defended their pursuit of the rational actor model on the
grounds that it was the best game in town: it gave well-defined (refutable, and,
•* For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Stiglitz (1990).
Whether the recent literature on mechanism design will contribute significantly to these discussions
remains a moot question. So far, it has not.
Already, these discussions have made clear the central importance of certain 'institutional' features
(including laws regulating competition and bankruptcy) which were ignored in traditional neoclassical
economics, though focused upon in the imperfect information-imperfect markets paradigm.
' See Hannaway (1989) or Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
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unfortunately, refuted) predictions, while tbe alternative was a Pandora's box
- there was an infinity of possible irrational behaviours.
Just as one of tbe great contributions of twentietb-century neoclassical
economics was to make clear why considerations which they bad excluded from
tbeir analyses - such as information and transactions costs - simply had to be
brought into the analysis, so too one of tbe central contributions of game theory
has been to make it clear that tbe 'rational' actor model is not only
descriptively inaccurate (as earlier economists bad charged), but internally
incomplete and/or inconsistent (see Binmore (1987, 1988) and Reny (1985)).
Tbe hope of game theory that some simple version of rationality could lead to
well-defined, let alone reasonable, predictions of behaviour bas been dashed.
Game theorists have increasingly relied in their analyses on 'small' degrees of
irrationality, while at tbe same time showing tbat tbe exact nature of the
equilibrium depends precisely on the nature of tbese small irrationalities (see
Fudenberg and Maskin (1990)). Tbis research makes it clear (if it was not
already so) tbat economists must study how individuals actually bebave,
whether that conforms to some economists' preconception of rationality or not.
Fortunately, advances in sociology and psychology (see, for example, the
work of Tversky) have shown tbat tbere may be systematic patterns to
individual behaviour, even wben they are irrational. Economic science is
concerned with exploring predictable bebaviour; tbe fact tbat behaviour is not
rational, in some sense, does not mean that is not predictable. Akerlof, in a
variety of papers, has sbown that these concerns can be incorporated into
economic models. I anticipate tbat over the next century major advances in this
direction will occur. At the same time, different people behave differently in
different situations. It is not clear that tbere will emerge out of tbis work a
general theory - a theory of tbe generality of the 'rational actor' model.
IX. THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT
Deciding on the appropriate role for government has long been one of the
central concerns of economics. This, too, is one of the questions wbicb tbe
former socialist economies are now asking themselves. As the century draws to
a close, many of the achievements of twentieth-century economics in this
regard are being called into question.
First, tbe Fundamental Theorems of Welfare Economics provided not only
tbe formal articulation of Adam Smith's invisible band conjecture, tbey also
provided the framework for the market failures approach to tbe role of
government. Yet, more recently, Greenwald and Stiglitz (1986, 1988) bave
sbown that whenever markets are incomplete and information is imperfect -
that is, essentially, always - the economy is almost never constrained Pareto
efficient; there are, in principle, government interventions, consistent with tbe
limitations on markets and information, wbicb can make some individuals
better off without making anyone else worse off.
The market failures approach itself was attacked by the Public Choice
economists, who emphasised tbat one bad to analyse the bebaviour of tbe
government in terms of rational behaviour of voters, bureaucrats, and special
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interest groups. But while these theories share with stock market analysts the
ability to provide ready interpretations of whatever occurs, their success in
predicting these political forces is much more limited. How do we explain why
alleged rent-seeking behaviour interferes with economic efliciency in Pakistan,
but has much more limited deleterious effects in Korea; why corruption in
Korea was a problem in some periods and not in others; why agriculture is
subsidised in those countries where it is small and taxed where it is large; why
the same pattern does not exist for other commodities; why was there
'regulatory capture' in some states, in some industries and not in others? If
economists really believed these models, why devote so much effort to changing
the Common Agriculture policy? Surely the words of a few economists cannot
change the economic realities?
Yet the centrality of the issues will ensure that these issues will continue to
be a primary focus of research in the coming century. I envisaged considerable
advances in defining the ways in which government is different from other
economic institutions,* understanding the circumstances under which markets
are not constrained Pareto efficient and devising institutional arrangements
which will enable the government to effect Pareto improvements, and in
enhancing our understanding of public failures, both the circumstances in
which they occur and the reasons for them. These advances, I suspect, will
make use of the insights into organisations and the broader perspectives on
economic behaviour described in the preceding two subsections.
X. DYNAMICS
The formal achievements in dynamic economics of the past century are indeed
impressive; these include developments in linear and nonlinear business cycles,
chaos, turnpike theory, and neoclassical growth theory. We have come to
recognise the central role of expectations, and the kind of dichotomy common
in the earlier part of the century, where ad hoc dynamics are adjoined to
sophisticated equilibrium behaviour, is now eschewed by the profession at
large. Yet, when all is said and done, while our mathematical tools for
analysing dynamics are greatly improved, I am not sure that we have learned
a great deal about either the short- or long-run dynamics of the economy.
Short-run dynamic models have ignored the central role that credit constraints,
partly based on information asymmetries, play.
In the long run, technological change is central, as Schumpter emphasised
and as the neoclassical growth models of the 1960s helped to quantify. We now
have a better understanding of the microeconomics of technological change, and
work has begun on the construction of macroeconomic models based on those
microeconomic foundations, models which reflect some of Schumpeter's views
concerning the role of credit constraints and imperfect competition. These
models incorporate both learning by doing and R & D expenditures.
Though over the years, economists have played a certain amount of lip-
service to evolutionary processes and the role of natural selection, there has
' I have attempted a beginning of this line of enquiry in Stiglitz (1989).
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been relatively little formal modelling of this evolutionary process,^ of the role
that bankruptcy laws and competition policy play in that process, and indeed,
no evaluation of the efficiency with which that process works, and upon what
that depends.
These failures have increasingly been recognised, and the work that has
recently begun trying to remedy these deficiencies at least holds out the hope
that over the coming decades, significant progress will be made.
XI. THE FAILURES OF TWrENTY-FIRST-CENTURY ECONOMICS
I have dwelt extensively on what I see as the most important achievements of
economics over the next century: the development of a general economic
theory, unifying macroeconomics and microeconomics, able both to explain its
aggregative behaviour and the details of some of its more important institutions.
I have forecast partial success in three other dimensions: an understanding of
the economic behaviour of organisations, within which so much economic
activity occurs; a development which in turn will be based on an incorporation
into economics of systematic findings of other social sciences, notably
psychology and sociology; and an enhanced understanding of the economic
role of the government, and the development of a theory of public failure to
parallel our analysis of market failure. Within the more developed countries,
these enhanced understandings will, I am confident, lead to better public
economic policies and greater economic efficiency, both within the public and
private sectors, contributing a modicum to an enhanced standard of living.
There is one important area in which I am less sanguine about the future
success of our profession. I began the study of economics with the (admittedly
naive) hope that the study of economics would somehow enable something to
be done about the plight of the three-quarters of mankind living in desperate
poverty, particularly within the Third World. In the ensuing quarter of a
century, we have seen remarkable growth in several countries, some of which
have moved out of the ranks of the less developed. In each case, we can, with
the vision of hindsight, tell stories about what led to success. But we have no
prescription, no formula with which to go to those who remain among the poor,
which gives them even a reasonable hope of success. Indeed, we can only
imperfectly guess which among the LDCs will be successful, or even which of
the more developed countries will fail to grow. Who in the middle of the
nineteenth century, could have forecast the fortunes of England and Argentina?
In the ensuing century, several of the less developed countries will undoubtedly
join the ranks of the middle and upper income countries. If we are lucky, our
studies of developing countries will enable a few more countries to escape the
mire of poverty within which they have lived for centuries. We can only try.
Stanford University
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